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Résumé 
 
Nous étudions deux programmes de privatisation de masse, en Pologne et en République 
tchèque, et montrons que les structures de l’actionnariat dans les deux pays ont rapidement 
évolué depuis la distribution initiale des droits de propriété. La concentration du capital a 
fortement augmenté et nous observons une reallocation significative entre les différents 
groupes d’actionnaires. Ce résultat va à l’encontre de la critique principale adressée aux 
programmes de privatisation de masse, mettant en garde contre la dispersion du capital qu’ils 
devraient entraîner.  
 
Le fait que le degré de la concentration du capital est similaire en Pologne et en République 
tchèque suggère que les bénéfices privés de contrôle soient importants dans les deux pays. 
Cependant, lorsque nous analysons les déterminants de la concentration de la propriété nous 
trouvons une différence importante : en République tchèque il est moins probable que le 
capital est plus concentré dans les entreprises moins performantes tandis qu’en Pologne la 
qualité de la performance passée n’affecte pas la volonté des investisseurs d’augmenter leurs 
participations. Cet effet contrasté peut être interprété à la lumière de la théorie mettant accent 
sur  l’importance de la qualité du système légal pour le comportement des investisseurs : la 
Pologne est d’habitude louée pour la rigueur de sa régulation tandis que la République 
tchèque, notamment au début des années 90, a été blâmée pour sa faiblesse. Ainsi, bien que la 
comparaison directe de la concentration du capital dans les deux pays ne permette pas de 
confirmer l’une des prédictions principales de la théorie ‘law matters’, nous trouvons une 
confirmation indirecte en sa faveur.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Focusing on two different mass privatization schemes in two transition economies, Poland 
and the Czech Republic, we show that the ownership structure in the two countries has rapidly 
evolved since the initial distribution of property rights Ownership concentration has 
significantly increased and we can observe an important reallocation of ownership claims 
between different groups of shareholders. This evidence goes against the main argument of 
the critics of mass privatization concerned with the dispersed ownership structure these 
programs were supposed to generate.  
 
The fact that the degree of ownership concentration is similar in Poland and in the Czech 
Republic suggests that private benefits of control are large in both countries. However, when 
we consider the determinants of ownership concentration we find an interesting difference: in 
the Czech Republic the increase in ownership concentration is less likely in poorly performing 
firms while in Poland the quality of past performance does not affect investors’ willingness to 
increase their holdings. This contrasting effect may be interpreted in the light of the theory 
stressing the importance of the quality of the legal system for investors’ behaviour: Poland is 
usually praised for high standards of its regulation while the Czech Republic, especially in the 
early and mid-1990s, has been blamed for its weaknesses. So, although direct comparison of 
ownership concentration in the two countries does not provide confirmation of the main 
prediction of ‘law matters’ theory, we find indirect evidence in its favour.  
.  
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1. Introduction1 
 
Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe strongly relied on ‘wholesale’ methods to transfer 
assets from the state to the private sector. These strategies, often qualified as 'mass 
privatization', consisted of a free transfer of equity of a large number of firms to large 
segments of the population. Since the beginning of transition, mass privatization has been 
strongly criticised as being 'artificial' and unable to provide firms with 'real owners' or to 
improve firm performance. One of the main criticisms concerned the dispersed ownership 
structure that mass privatisation was expected to generate. Some countries, e.g. Poland, 
sensitive to this argument, chose to impose a concentrated ownership structure on privatized 
firms. The main concern was avoiding excessive dispersion of ownership and providing 
companies with ‘effective owners’, capable and willing to enforce control over management 
and undertake profound firm restructuring. In other countries, such as the Czech Republic, 
where privatization was understood as the key element of the process of radical institutional 
change and was expected to create important synergies, the main concern was the speed of the 
process and less attention was paid to the emergence of a specific ownership structure.  
 
Several years after the initial distribution of firms' equity, it is still largely believed that mass 
privatization schemes were plagued with inefficiencies mostly due to rigid and/or inefficient 
ownership structure. However, if we look at the actual change at firm level it turns out that the 
effective reallocation of property rights has been quite extensive and that the ownership 
concentration has significantly increased.2 Therefore, it becomes interesting to describe this 
evolution in detail and to explore if and how ownership structure adjusted to firm specific 
characteristics and to factors characterizing the firm's environment.  
 
It should be stressed that the objective of this paper is quite modest. We do not try to assess 
whether and how ownership structure affects performance. Neither have we distinguished the 
managerial ownership dimension of ownership structure. These are important questions that 
                                                 
1  We are grateful to Jean-Francois Nivet for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper and 
to Erjon Luci and Bartlomiej Paczoski for invaluable help with the data. 
2 Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) document high ownership concentration in a number of transition 
economies. 
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have been studied by a number of authors and also need to be investigated further.3 In 
focusing on the determinants of ownership concentration we follow the literature initiated by 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who argued that ownership structure should be 
viewed as the result of shareholders’ optimizing decisions.4 Considering the determinants of 
ownership concentration may be viewed as a first step. The next and an important extension 
of this paper would be to consider the relationship between ownership and firm performance 
in a simultaneous equation framework: in such framework with firm performance and 
ownership concentration being the two dependent variables, we could consider potential 
causality running form ownership to performance. 
 
We focus on firms privatized through two different mass privatization schemes in two 
transition economies, Poland and the Czech Republic. Mass privatization offers a particularly 
suitable framework to study the change in ownership concentration as the extent of change is 
unusual for a stable market economy. We find that despite important differences in the design 
of the two programmes and despite different quality of legal and regulatory framework, 
ownership structure in the two countries has rapidly evolved and the emerging ownership 
patterns are remarkably similar. Ownership concentration has significantly increased and we 
can observe an important reallocation of ownership claims between different groups of 
shareholders. In the Czech Republic, starting from a highly dispersed ownership structure, in 
almost half of companies a majority of shares is held by a single block holder. Similarly in 
Poland, starting from a particular ownership structure imposed by the National Investment 
Funds (NIF) programme, the majority of companies involved in the scheme have been freed 
of NIFs’ control and almost half of them have found a single block holding entity with a 
majority of shares. Ownership concentration, defined as the presence of a majority 
shareholder or the increase in the share of the largest owner, seems to be mainly determined 
by firms’ past performance and by the identity of the largest owner.  
 
                                                 
3 For important theoretical contributions see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
Bolton and von Tadden (1998), Burkart et al. (1997). Some of recent empirical papers include 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Himmelberg, et al. (1999), Miguel, et al. (2001).  Works on transition 
economies include Claessens and Djankov (1999), Kocenda and Svejnar (2003), and Simoneti, et al. 
(2003).  
4 For recent contributions, see Bebchuk (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Lamba and Stapledon 
(2002). Jones and Mygind (1999) and Jones, et al. (2003) deal with the determinants of ownership 
structure in a transition economy.  
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The difference between the two countries appears when we consider how past performance 
affects the increase in ownership concentration: it turns out that the impact of past 
performance is positive in the Czech Republic and insignificant or even negative in Poland. 
This suggests that in Poland shareholders believe they can obtain some benefits of control and 
do not fear increasing their holdings in less profitable firms while in the Czech Republic less 
profitable firms are considered as too risky and shareholders prefer increasing their equity 
holdings in better performing firms. Such result may be interpreted in the light of "law 
matters" theory due to La Porta, et al. (1998).5 The difference in the shareholders' attitude 
towards risk in the two countries may indeed be due to the differences in the quality of the 
legal framework. Poland is usually praised for high standards of its regulation while the Czech 
Republic, especially in the early and mid-1990s, has been blamed for its weaknesses (see 
Glaeser, et al., 2001) 
 
The evidence of a dynamic adjustment of the ownership structure provided in this paper 
suggests that, contrary to the concern of the critics of mass privatisation programmes, they 
were not the most inefficient way of transferring assets from the state to the public sector. The 
initial ownership structure they created was transitory and rapidly gave way to new 
configurations. This evidence may help to explain the apparently surprising result of Bennett, 
et al. (2004). Analyzing the impact of various privatization methods on economic growth in a 
cross-country setting, they find that mass privatization was the only method with a 
significantly positive effect. Although we do not consider here the relationship between 
privatization and performance, the fact that ownership structure in our firms has become 
highly concentrated may provide an element of explanation. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the two mass privatization 
schemes in Poland and in the Czech Republic and show how ownership concentration and the 
type of the controlling shareholders have changed since the beginning of the process. In 
section 3 we consider the potential determinants of ownership concentration. Empirical model 
is presented in section 4, the results in section 5 and we conclude in section 6. 
 
                                                 
5 Looking at cross-country variations, La Porta, et al. (1998) find that concentration of ownership 
(measured by the stake of the three largest shareholders) is negatively correlated with the quality of 
investors’ legal protection. In other words ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal 
protection of investors.   
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2. Mass Privatisation and after: reallocation of equity stakes in the Czech 
Republic and Poland. 
 
Despite broad similarity of their reform programme, Poland and the Czech Republic 
embarked on two different variants of mass privatisation (briefly described in Appendix 1). 
Various political and social considerations played a role. Most importantly, the choice was 
determined by the policy makers’ understanding of the role of privatisation in market 
processes. In Poland privatisation was seen as a means of improving firm incentives and its 
real objective was firm restructuring. More orthodox methods of privatisation (IPOs, 
negotiated sales, auctions, etc.) were seen as more efficient from that point of view, but it 
soon became clear that privatisation would be too slow if it were to rely exclusively on such 
methods. Therefore, the National Investment Funds (NIF) programme was initiated to 
supplement other methods and speed up the process. The design of this programme was 
dominated by the concern about corporate governance arrangements favouring enterprise 
restructuring. In particular, a concentrated ownership structure was imposed on firms and the 
funds were to be managed by highly experienced Western specialists. 
 
In the Czech Republic (and before that in Czechoslovakia) privatisation was understood as the 
precondition for the emergence of a market environment. Voucher privatisation was seen as 
the most rapid and the least unfair way of transferring assets from the State sector. It was 
expected that under competitive pressure the initial ownership structure would gradually 
evolve towards a more effective structure.  
 
The two different philosophies underlying the two mass privatisation programmes are 
reflected in the design of the regulations of securities markets in the two countries. Poland is 
usually given as an example of a good regulatory strategy while the Czech Republic is blamed 
for the weakness of its regulatory framework (Glaeser, et al., 2001). Indeed, the Polish 
authorities were concerned with the proper development of financial markets in general, and 
the stock exchange in particular, and focused on the creation of a well established legal 
system and enforceable laws. In the NIF programme, the remuneration scheme for NIF 
managers and the stock exchange listing requirements were carefully designed to ensure the 
transparency of the process and to avoid expropriation of minority investors. The main 
concern was to avoid excessive dispersion of ownership and to provide companies with 
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'effective owners'. But the authors of the programme were also concerned with the potential 
danger of private benefits of control and therefore imposed the limit of 33 percent on the lead 
fund’s holdings in each company.  
 
Such guarantees were deemed unnecessary in the Czech Republic: there was a fear that state 
intervention would create impediments to a rapid development of market institutions. The 
Company law and the laws governing the operation of securities markets were very lax and 
the supervision of securities trading and the associated agents were, until 1998, left to a 
Securities Office in the Ministry of Finance. Privatised companies were listed on the stock 
exchange without having to publish a prospectus and to obtain the approval of the securities 
regulator. The increasing number of financial scandals and opportunistic behaviour involving 
funds and enterprise managers (later called ‘tunnelling’) reflected the weakness of the regulatory 
framework.6 The pressure from the opposition parties and the press eventually forced the 
government to establish the Securities Commission. 
  
The Data 
 
The data for Czech companies is provided by a Czech commercial company, Aspekt 
(www.aspekt.cz) who use official company accounts filed by joint stock companies (for 
financial information), Prague Securities Centre (for ownership information), and company 
reports for employment and other information. The financial data covers the period of 1993-
1999 while the ownership data covers the period 1996 to 1999. The data-set was purchased in 
early 2000 and consequently the information for 1999 is not complete for all companies. The 
ownership data includes the identity and the equity holdings of up to seven largest 
shareholders of each company since 1996. There are five types of owners: industrial and 
commercial companies (corporations), investment funds, financial institutions,7 individuals 
and the state. The database does not identify foreign ownership. 
 
                                                 
6  For examples of opportunistic behaviour by managers and large shareholders, see Hashi (1998); 
Johnson, et al. (2000) and Glaeser, et al. (2001). 
7 The data set contained two sub-groups of financial institutions: portfolio companies (which are 
engaged primarily in buying and selling of shares) and banks. However, as the number of firms in 
these two sub-groups was small, they were combined together under ‘financial institutions’ in order to 
make the empirical work more meaningful. 
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The data set contains financial information on the bulk of mass privatised companies but the 
ownership information is limited to a smaller number of companies because many mass 
privatised companies have left the stock exchange, changed their legal status or have been 
taken over by other companies. After careful cleaning of the data base (involving the deletion 
of observations containing obvious errors) we established a balanced panel of 652 companies 
for which full ownership information is available for the 1996-1999 period.8 The sample is 
well distributed across 12 sectors of economic activity.9  
 
The Polish data set, containing all 512 mass privatised companies and covering the 1995-2000 
period, was collected from several sources. The Ministry of State Treasury (Department of 
Privatisation) keeps some basic data on the 512 companies in the National Investment Fund 
Programme, largely for the period before their privatisation. The Department keeps a record 
of major changes in the status of these companies. Additional information was collected from 
the annual reports of NIFs and their portfolio companies through the publication Monitor 
Polski, NIFs' annual reports and the reports of the Association of National Investment Funds. 
For companies that have been floated on the stock exchange, further information was obtained 
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange. In the final sample analyzed in this paper we do not 
include firms that went bankrupt or for some reasons were deleted from the registry kept in 
the Ministry of State Treasury. We also exclude observations with missing data. The number 
of firms in the sample was therefore reduced to 439.  
 
Unlike in the Czech Republic, the initial ownership structure of the companies in the mass 
privatisation scheme was uniform and fixed by the scheme (the lead fund had 33 percent of 
shares; other 14 funds 27 percent; employees 15 percent and the state 25 percent). The 
information on ownership change throughout the period 1995-2000, collected from the variety 
of sources described above, allows identifying the largest owners of the companies. It shows 
the extent of the divestiture by NIFs. The distinction is made between foreign and domestic 
shareholders; among the latter there are companies, NIFs, employees, individuals and the 
state.   
                                                 
8 There are occasionally missing observations for individual variables which lowers the number of 
observations to 610 in the regressions presented in Section 5. 
9 Originally firms were grouped into 19 activities based on Prague Stock Exchange classification of 
sectoral activity (which closely resembles NACE classification) but as the number of firms in some 
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Changes in the ownership structure 
 
We focus on two dimensions of the change in the ownership structure. First, we look at 
ownership concentration, measured by the share of the largest owner. Second, we consider the 
reallocation of block holdings between different types of owners. The evidence from both 
Poland and the Czech Republic points to an unambiguous increase in concentration of 
ownership in both countries. Table 1 highlights the broad picture of this evolution. 
 
The average holdings of the largest shareholder in the Czech sample increased rapidly from 
38.8 percent in 1996 to 51.9 percent in 1999 and in the Polish sample from 33.9 percent in 
1996 to 50.3 percent in 2000. In the Czech Republic the median figure indicates that by 1999 
in half of the sample firms the largest owner held almost 50 percent of the firm's equity. The 
number of firms in which the largest shareholder controls more than 50 percent of shares 
increased indeed from 189 in 1996 to 289 in 1999. 
  
The Polish scheme, due to its cautious design, had a degree of inertia built into it. Dominant 
owners, i.e., the ‘lead funds’ holding 33 percent of company shares initially, could not 
increase their share in portfolio companies until they were floated on the stock market or their 
capital was increased. At the same time, companies could not be floated on the stock market 
until they could meet (as any listed company) the stringent listing criteria set by the regulatory 
agency. Despite these restrictions, a significant reallocation of equity holdings, triggered by a 
combination of the NIFs' incentive system and the competitive pressure from the product and 
factor markets, occurred quite rapidly. NIFs have withdrawn from managing a large number 
of portfolio companies. Some firms were floated on the stock exchange, others were sold to 
strategic (domestic or foreign) investors, and some were put into liquidation. NIFs proved to 
be the agents of privatisation rather than agents of restructuring. The net results, as panel (b) 
of Table 1 shows, were that by the year 2000, the largest shareholders were, on average, in 
absolute control of their companies. The differences in the initial ownership structure 
notwithstanding, the process was very similar to that in the Czech Republic.  
 
The second dimension of the change in the ownership structure is the reallocation of 
ownership rights between different types of largest shareholders. This process was different in 
                                                                                                                                                        
sectors was very small, for reasons of empirical feasibility, we grouped firms in similar activities and 
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the two samples because of the particularities of the privatization process in the two countries 
and the initially uniform ownership structure of the Polish firm. In Poland, the reallocation of 
ownership was first dominated by the transfer from the state to NIFs and then from NIFs to 
other types of owners. While in 1994 all firms were state-owned, by 2000 the state had 
reduced its holdings to zero in 99 firms and to about 20 percent (on average) in the remaining 
firms. About 15 percent of the companies in the scheme went bankrupt or entered the 
bankruptcy or liquidation processes. 36 companies (about 7 percent of the companies in the 
scheme, 25 of them with strategic investors) have satisfied the listing conditions set by the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange and were quoted on the WSE in 2000.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 show how equity held by different types of the largest owner has evolved in 
Poland between 1998 and 2000 and in the Czech Republic between 1996 and 1999. 
 
In Poland NIFs have withdrawn from 240 firms leaving the companies to the new owner, with 
over 20 percent of them (52 companies) having been sold to foreign investors. Concerning the 
concentration of ownership stakes, it is striking that, on average, most strategic investors have 
gained majority control of the firms' equity. Only NIFs, on average, hold 37 percent of shares 
of their portfolio companies. The employees, who were given special privileges in the Polish 
mass privatization, have acquired control of 13 companies. The highest ownership 
concentration (75 percent) can be observed in firms bought by foreign investors. 
 
Similarly, in the Czech Republic we can observe a gradual process of reallocation of large 
block holdings between different types of owners. In the immediate post-privatization period,  
the state, financial institutions and investment funds were the most important large 
shareholders. A couple of years later we can observe the emergence of individual 
entrepreneurs and industrial and commercial companies as the largest shareholders. All 
categories of largest owners have increased their equity stakes. Industrial and commercial 
companies and financial institutions have increased their average holding to over 56 percent 
while individuals and investment funds have increased their average holding to around 45-46 
percent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
formed 12 industrial sectors. 
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The unusually rapid changes in ownership structure in firms included in the mass privatisation 
programmes in the Czech Republic and Poland give us the opportunity to empirically 
investigate the determinants of these changes. The owners’ desire to change the initially 
imposed (Poland) or inefficient (the Czech Republic) ownership structure reflected, and 
certainly responded to, a variety of firm specific characteristics and factors representing the 
environment in which firms operate. In what follows we try to identify the determinants of the 
increase in ownership concentration in the group of Czech and Polish firms. 
 
3. What makes ownership more or less concentrated? 
 
We look at within country variations in ownership structure which means that we do not 
consider here the important issue on which the work by La Porta, et al. (1998) focused:10 legal 
and regulatory constraints are held constant. We try to identify the determinants of ownership 
concentration at the level of the firm. We use two dummy variables for ownership 
concentration: 1) the increase/decrease of the share of the largest owner since the initial 
allocation of property rights, and 2) the presence/absence of a majority shareholder (holding 
more than 50 percent of shares).  
 
In line with several previous studies investigating the determinants of ownership 
concentration, we expect the following factors to influence our two dependent variables:  
 
Performance   
 
Owners’ decision to increase their holding may depend on firm performance. It is possible 
that in less profitable firms shareholders want to increase their holdings in order to better 
control the management and obtain some of the benefits of control. On the other hand, such 
firms may be less attractive for risk-averse shareholders looking for risk diversification. The 
                                                 
10 Looking at cross-country variations, La Porta, et al. (1998) find that concentration of ownership 
(measured by the stake of the three largest shareholders) is negatively correlated with the quality of 
investors' legal protection. In other words, ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal 
protection of investors.  
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impact of performance on owners’ decision to concentrate their holdings is therefore 
ambiguous.11 
 
It is difficult to choose an ideal performance indicator for non-listed firms in transition 
economies. We use earnings before taxes and depreciation which is the commonly used 
measure. Alternatively, we use the growth of sales as a measure of performance: it is 
sometimes argued that it is less subject to accounting manipulations. Additionally, we include 
investment which may be considered as a proxy for the future prospects of the firm. We 
expect that higher investment activity leads current and potential shareholders to increase 
their holdings in the firm.  
 
Size 
 
It is usually expected that ownership in larger firms is less likely to be highly concentrated. 
Purchasing large equity shares in a large company is more expensive than doing the same in a 
smaller company. Moreover, the concern for diversification also suggests that owners will be 
careful and refrain from committing a larger fraction of their wealth to one firm. In some 
previous studies (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) firm size was inversely related to ownership 
concentration. On the other hand, in the highly uncertain conditions of transition economies, 
larger, older and better known firms may be perceived by some shareholders as less likely to 
go bankrupt. In this case, such shareholders would increase their shareholding in larger firms. 
The overall impact of size on ownership structure may thus be ambiguous.  
 
Leverage 
 
Also the effect of leverage on ownership concentration may be ambiguous. Highly leveraged 
firms are more risky and risk averse owners may prefer avoiding excessive concentration in 
such firms (Stulz 1988, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Similarly, if leverage is seen as a control 
instrument used to reduce agency costs and creditors substitute owners in their monitoring 
activities, we would expect ownership concentration to be lower in more leveraged firms. But 
                                                 
11 This ambiguity appears in the previous works. For instance, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find 
that performance has a significant and negative effect on ownership concentration while in Jones, et al. 
(2003) previous profitability does not affect ownership structure in a significant way.  
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debt may also be viewed as complementary monitoring device: in that case higher ownership 
concentration may appear in more indebted companies.  
 
Identity of the dominant shareholder  
 
The degree of ownership concentration may strongly depend on who the largest shareholder 
is. It is therefore important to distinguish between different types of block holders. For 
example, a corporation may have stronger motivation than a financial institution to acquire 
large stakes in a firm. The state and the National Investment Funds in Poland are supposed to 
wither away as owners and we expect that their equity will progressively diminish. The 
nationality of the dominant owners may also affect ownership concentration: foreign owners 
may be more willing and capable of acquiring larger stakes in order to control the company. 
In Poland we can distinguish between foreign and domestic investors; and among the latter 
between corporations, individuals, employees, NIFs and the state. In the Czech Republic we 
can distinguish between corporations, individuals, investment funds, financial institutions, and 
the state. 
 
Industry 
 
Ownership concentration may vary across industries. Some industries are more likely to have 
dispersed ownership than others. One of the possible explanations of these differences would 
be that different types of activities require different level of monitoring.12 In some industries 
closer monitoring may bring about gains to shareholders13 while in others, especially those 
regulated by the state, additional monitoring by large shareholders may not yield any 
benefits.14 Hence, we have to control for the type of the industry in order to take this effect 
into account. 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Carlin and Mayer (1999) and Allen (1993). 
13 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) call it 'control potential' and Bebchuk (1999) speaks about private benefits 
of control.  
14 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, e.g., control for regulated industries 
(financial and utilities). 
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4. The model  
 
We analyse the determinants of ownership concentration using two dependent variables. First, 
we estimate the probability that the share of the largest owner has increased since the initial 
allocation of equity stakes (Y1). This was the case in 491 firms in the Czech Republic and in 
219 firms in Poland. Secondly, we estimate the probability that a company has a majority 
shareholder at the end of the considered period (Y2). In our samples, 44 percent of firms in 
Poland in 2000 and 49 percent in the Czech Republic in 1999 have a shareholder with more 
than 50 percent of shares. 
 
We use the following general model to identify the factors that affect our dependent variables:  
 
P (Yj=1/ X ) = 
)exp(1
)exp(
b
b
X
X
+
 
 
Where j=1, 2. 
 
P (Y1 = 1/ X ) is the probability that the share of the largest owner has increased since the 
beginning of the process and  
P (Y2 = 1/ X ) is the probability that the largest owner holds more than 50 percent of shares, 
both conditioned on the realization of X , which represents the vector of explanatory 
variables and b  is the corresponding vector of coefficients.  
 
The vector of explanatory variables X  includes the following variables: performance, size, 
leverage, investment, type of the largest owner, industry, and a set of variables representing 
specific features of mass privatisation in the two countries.  
 
Performance is defined as ratio of earnings before taxes and depreciation to total assets (the 
growth of sales is used as another proxy for performance); size is measured by natural 
logarithm of sales in constant prices; leverage is defined as total liabilities over total assets; 
investment is the ratio of net investment in fixed assets to total assets. In order to alleviate the 
problem of potential endogeneity of ownership concentration, the four variables 
(performance, size, leverage and investment) are averaged over the period ending one year 
earlier than the year for which ownership is considered. (i.e., 1996-1998 for the Czech sample 
and 1995-1999 for the Polish sample). Type of owner is a set of dummies representing 
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different types of the largest shareholder. Industry represents a set of dummies for industries 
to which the firm belongs (12 for Czech firms and 20 in Poland).  
 
In the case of the Czech Republic we want to distinguish between firms that were privatised 
in the first and in the second wave of the voucher scheme. We also include the initial level of 
ownership concentration (in 1996).15 We obviously expect that the increase in ownership 
concentration will be less likely in firms that were initially already highly concentrated. Such 
firms are also more likely to have at the end of the process a majority investor. In Poland, the 
initial level of ownership concentration was by design the same for all firms so we do not 
include this variable in the regressions. In the case of Polish mass privatised firms we 
distinguish between listed and non-listed firms by using a dummy variable for firms that are 
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). It may be expected that firms listed on the 
stock exchange are more likely to have widely held share ownership structure. We also want 
to distinguish between various National Investment Funds and we include a set of dummies 
representing the lead National Investment Fund of each company (15 NIFs altogether). We 
know that these funds differed in their strategies towards firms in their portfolios: some funds 
behaved more like venture capital funds while others chose strategies of purely financial 
intermediaries. Firms' ownership concentration might have been influenced by these 
strategies. The full list of variables is presented in Table 4. 
 
5. The results  
 
Tables 5 and 6 show respectively the results for Poland and for the Czech Republic. For each 
of the two dependent variables we present two sets of regressions: with and without dummies 
representing the type of the largest shareholder. For Poland additionally, before adding all 
types of domestic owners, we show, in columns 2 and 5 the results of the regression in which 
only foreign versus domestic owner is considered.  
 
The inclusion of the type of the largest owner significantly improves the explanatory power of 
the regressions, particularly in Poland. In both countries most of the coefficients of the 
                                                 
15 Ownership concentration is measured by the share of the largest shareholder. In the regression 
analysis, we use a logistic transformation of this measure. See table 4 for the exact definition.  
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dummies representing the type of the largest owner are significant.16  In particular, in Poland 
the firm is significantly more likely to be majority controlled if it has a foreign largest 
shareholder. The presence of a foreign dominant shareholder also significantly influences the 
probability of an increase in its equity holdings. Interpreting the coefficients of various 
dummies representing the types of owners we should remember that the reference group is the 
state in the Czech Republic and the state together with NIFs in Poland .These types of owners 
are supposed to wither away and therefore it is not surprising that other categories are more 
likely to increase their equity holdings and to take majority control.  
 
We do not observe a significant relationship between ownership concentration and either 
leverage or investment. But some of the privatisation-related variables turn out to be quite 
important. Firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are less likely to experience 
increasing concentration and are less likely to have a majority owner. It could be argued that 
ownership dispersion is safer in listed firms as investors have access to a much greater amount 
of information and also a certain amount of monitoring is undertaken by the financial market 
itself. So the opportunities for reaping the benefits of control by increasing ownership 
concentration and monitoring are more limited. Moreover, according to the regulation of the 
WSE, beyond a certain level of ownership concentration, the dominant shareholders have to 
make compulsory purchase offers to other shareholders, which may require a prohibitively 
large amount of resources. In the Czech Republic, as expected, the higher the initial level of 
ownership concentration, the lower the probability that the share of the largest shareholder has 
increased and the higher the probability that the firm has found a majority owner.  
 
The evidence about the importance of firm size is mixed: it becomes insignificant in Poland 
when all types of largest owners are included and only slightly positive in the Czech 
Republic. This result suggests that the desire of diversification and the search for a safe 
investment (which large firms may offer in an uncertain environment) counteract each other. 
More importantly, we get a contrasting result comparing the correlation between firms' past 
performance and ownership concentration in the two countries. In Poland firm's past 
performance does not seem to affect the probability of the increase in the share of the largest 
                                                 
16 Only in the Czech Republic the presence/absence of a majority shareholder is not affected by the 
largest shareholder being an individual or an investment fund. These two categories of owners were 
the main players in the auctions of the voucher scheme and their behaviour might not differ 
significantly from the state, which is here the base group.  
 17
owner (it is even slightly negative if we do not control for the type of the largest owner). Also, 
the presence of a majority shareholder is more likely in firms characterized by poor past 
profitability. In contrast, in the Czech Republic the coefficient of past profitability is positive 
and affects very strongly the probability that the share of the largest owner has increased. This 
result may reflect the owners' willingness to avoid increasing their equity holdings in the 
Czech poorly performing firms. In Poland, investors appear more likely trying to reap some 
benefits of control.17    
 
The results are robust to the use of an alternative measure of firm performance:  the growth of 
sales, and an alternative measure of firm size:  the natural logarithm of the value of assets.18 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In firms privatized in the framework of mass privatization programmes in Poland and the 
Czech Republic we observe a significant increase in ownership concentration measured by the 
share of the largest owner. This evidence goes against the main argument of the critics of 
mass privatization programmes who were convinced that these programmes would bring 
about dispersed ownership structure at firm level. The fact that the evolution of ownership 
concentration is similar in Poland and in the Czech Republic suggests that private benefits of 
control are large in both countries (see Bebchuk, 1999). If we refer to 'law matters' theory, this 
suggests that the quality of investor protection regime is rather low in both countries. So we 
do not get a confirmation of the usual view that the Polish legal and regulatory framework is 
much better than the one in the Czech Republic. However, although the direct comparison of 
ownership concentration in the two countries does not provide a confirmation of the main 
prediction of 'law matters' theory, we find indirect evidence in its favour.  
 
Looking at the relationship between the change in ownership concentration and firm 
performance, we find an interesting result: in the Czech Republic the increase in ownership 
concentration seems to be less likely in poorly performing firms while in Poland the quality of 
past performance does not affect investors' willingness to increase their holdings. This 
                                                 
17 Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) show that the performance of Polish listed firms improves when the 
largest owner has a majority stake in the company. 
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contrasting effect may be interpreted in the light of the theory stressing the importance of the 
quality of investors' protection. It could be argued indeed that if Czech investors seem to be 
more risk averse and more concerned with diversification this is largely due to the weakness 
of the legal protection they face.  
                                                                                                                                                        
18 The results are available on request. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Mass Privatisation in the Czech Republic 
 
 
The main method of privatisation in the Czech Republic was ‘voucher privatisation’ through 
which some 1700 companies were privatised in two ‘waves’ in 1991–92 and 1992–94. 19 The 
shares of these companies were transferred to either individuals or privatisation investment 
funds (PIFs) in exchange for vouchers. PIFs set up by manufacturing companies, private 
individuals and institutions as well as state-owned banks and insurance companies, actively 
participated in the process as financial intermediaries. Adult citizens received vouchers which 
they could exchange for the shares of companies in the scheme either directly or indirectly 
through privatisation investment funds. In the latter case, they could entrust their vouchers to 
investment funds and become shareholders of these funds (which were joint stock companies) 
or unit holders in unit trusts. The funds, in turn, could use vouchers collected from their 
members to bid for shares of their preferred companies. Understandably, given the prevailing 
information asymmetry and risk aversion, the majority of citizens opted for the second 
alternative and entrusted their vouchers to investment funds. In the first wave, 72 percent of 
investment points available were used by funds and 28 percent by individuals directly. In the 
second wave, the percentages were 64 percent and 36 percent respectively. The bulk of 
investment points controlled by funds were concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
funds set up by banks and financial institutions (Hashi 1998). In the first wave, these funds 
were all close-end funds but in the second wave many of them took the form of unit trusts. 
Later on, as part of the reform of the financial system, close-end funds were required to 
convert themselves to open funds by 2002. Initially, the funds were allowed to hold up to 20 
percent of the shares of each company in the scheme, though they quickly found ways of 
bypassing this constraint. The funds’ maximum holding in each company was later reduced to 
11 percent. 
 
The shares of mass privatised companies and privatisation investment funds were 
immediately listed on the stock market without the requirement of prior approval and the 
publication of a prospectus. The process of buying and selling of shares, and the 
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reorganisation of funds’ portfolios, quickly followed the two waves – a process generally 
referred to as the ‘third wave’ of privatisation. Investment funds, despite their large overall 
stakes, were generally not in a controlling position in their portfolio companies. Many funds 
had ended up with shares of too many companies and wanted to reduce the size of their 
portfolios. Many individual shareholders, preferring cash to risky shares, also entered the 
secondary market, selling their shares, thus further pushing down share prices.20 A major 
feature of the so-called third wave of privatisation was the take-over of investment funds. 
Given that PIFs (especially those set up in the first wave) were joint stock companies with a 
large number of shareholders, they were easy targets for aggressive bidders. 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 For details of the Czech privatization see Mejstrik (1997). 
20  It was estimated that in the early post-privatization period up to one-third of individuals who had 
obtained shares in the voucher scheme sold their shares. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Report, 2nd Quarter 1995, p. 15.  
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Mass Privatisation in Poland  
 
 
The scale of the Polish mass privatisation was less spectacular than the Czech scheme. It 
included 512 companies and 15 National Investment Funds (NIF), which were set up by the 
Government.21 The management of these funds was initially entrusted to special consortia of 
Western and Polish partners (commercial banks, investment banks, consulting firms) selected 
through an international tender offer. The implementation of the programme was delayed by 
at least four years (1991-95) for political reasons, mainly the absence of a consensus in the 
government and the parliament about the final list of companies in the scheme, the precise 
share of different beneficiaries and the specific arrangements concerning corporate 
governance of the NIFs. The equity of 512 companies was transferred from the state to new 
owners according to a common scheme: the majority of shares of each company (60 percent) 
were given to the 15 National Investment Funds, with the remaining 40 percent going to 
employees (15 percent) and the Treasury (25 percent). For each company, one of the 15 NIFs 
received 33 percent of shares and thus became the ‘lead fund’ for that company. The 
remaining 27 percent were divided between the other 14 funds (each holding just under 2 
percent of shares). This uniform scheme sharply contrasted with the Czech programme where 
the outcome of the bidding process was completely unforeseeable and any number of funds, 
individuals and other beneficiaries could end up as new owners of the companies. 
 
Foreign financial institutions were invited to participate in the programme and, together with 
Polish institutions, bid for the management of NIFs under lucrative remuneration 
arrangements. The aim was to bring in the fund management know-how and expertise and 
ensure that Polish institutions learn from their foreign partners. At the same time, foreign 
institutions with international reputation were expected to follow the same practice as in their 
own countries, and not to engage in opportunistic behavior, insider dealing and shareholder 
expropriation which their inexperienced Polish counterparts may have been tempted to 
embark on. Many foreign institutions did take part in the programme and most NIFs started to 
be managed by consortia of foreign and Polish institutions.  
 
                                                 
21  For details of the Polish mass privatisation, see Hashi (2000) and Mickiewicz and Baltowski 
(2003). 
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The citizens did not become direct shareholders of companies in the scheme but received 
vouchers (or certificates) which entitled them to one share in each of the 15 Funds, thus 
becoming indirect shareholders of privatised companies. The stated aim of the programme 
was for NIFs to restructure their portfolio companies, turn them into market oriented firms 
and sell them to either strategic owners or on the stock exchange. The Funds themselves were 
floated on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in June 1997 and the citizens’ certificates had to be 
converted to Funds’ shares by the end of 1998. Following a buoyant initial market, and the 
large-scale sale and purchase of shares, the role of the government began to decline and 
private owners began to dominate the NIFs. After the first general meetings of shareholders, 
members of the supervisory boards initially appointed by the government were replaced by 
members elected by new private shareholders. The direct role of the state in the funds came to 
an end. 
 23
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Allen, F. (1993), Stock market and resource allocation, in C. Mayer and X. Vives (eds.) 
Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A. (1999), A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control, NBER 
Working Paper n° 7203. 
 
Bennett, J., S. Estrin, J. W. Maw and G. Urga (2004), Privatization Methods and Economic 
Growth in Transition Economies, CEPR Discussion Paper n° 4291 
 
Berglof, E and A. Pajuste (2003), Emerging Owners, Eclipsing Markets? Corporate 
Governance in Central and Eastern Europe, in Cornelius, P.K. and B. Kogut (eds) Corporate 
Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy, OUP: Oxford. 
 
Bolton, P. and E.L. Von Tadden (1998), Blocks, liquidity and corporate control. Journal of 
Finance, February. 
 
Burkart, M., D. Gromb and F. Panunzi, (1997), Large shareholders, monitoring and the value of 
the firm.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 693-728. 
 
Carlin, W. and C. Mayer (1999), Finance, Investment and growth, CEPR Discussion Paper n° 
2233. 
 
Claessens, S. and S. Djankov (1999), Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in 
the Czech Republic, CEPR Discussion Paper 2145. 
 
Cho, M. (1998), Ownership Structure, Investment and the Corporate Value: an Empirical 
Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 47: 103-121. 
 
Demsetz, H (1983), The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26: 375-390. 
 
Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn (1985), The structure of ownership: Causes and consequences. 
Journal of Political Economy, 93 (6): 1155-1177. 
 
Demsetz, H., B. Villalonga (2001), Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 7 (3): 209-233. 
 
Djankov, S. and P. Murrell (2002). Enterprise restructuring in transition: A Quantitative 
Survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 40 (4): 1202-1214. 
 
Glaeser, E., S. Johnson and A. Shleifer (2001), Coase versus the Coasians. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 116 (3): 853-899.  
 
 24
Grosfeld, I. and T. Tressel (2002), Competition and ownership structure: substitutes or 
complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Economics of Transition, 10 (3): 
525-551. 
 
Hashi, I. (1998), Mass privatisation and corporate governance in the Czech Republic. 
Economic Analysis, 1(2): 163-187. 
 
Hashi, I. (2000), The Polish National Investment Fund programme: Mass privatization with a 
difference? Comparative Economic Studies, 42 (1): 87-134.  
 
Himmbelberg, C.P., R.G. Hubbard and D. Palia (1999), Understanding the determinants of 
managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 53 (3): 353-384. 
 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976), Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360. 
 
Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2000), Tunnelling, NBER 
Working Paper 7523. 
 
Jones, D.C., P. Kalmi and N. Mygind (2003), Choice of ownership structure and firm 
performance: Evidence from Estonia, William Davidson Institute Working Paper n° 560.  
 
Jones, D.C. and N. Mygind (1999), The Nature and Determinants of Ownership Changes after 
Privatisation: Evidence from Estonia, Journal of Comparative Economics, 27: 422-441. 
 
Kocenda, E. and J. Svejnar (2003), Ownership and Firm Peformance after Large-Scale 
Privatization, William Davidson Institute Working Paper n° 471a . 
 
Lamba, A.S. and G. Stapledon (2002), The determinants of corporate ownership structure: 
Australian evidence", mimeo.  
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (1998), Law and finance, Journal of 
Political Economy, 106: 1113-55.  
 
McConnell, J. and H. Servaes (1990), Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate 
value. Journal of Financial Economics, 2: 119-149. 
 
Mejstrik, M. (1997), The Privatisation Process in East-Central Europe: Evolutionary Process 
of Czech Privatization, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordecht. 
 
Mickiewicz, T., and M. Baltowski (2003), All Roads Lead to Outside Ownership: Polish 
Piecemeal Privatisation, Chapter 19 in Parker, D. and D. Saal (eds), International Handbook 
on Prtivatisation, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. 
 
Miguel A., J. Pindado and Ch. de la Torre (2001), Ownership structure and firm value: new 
evidence from the Spanish corporate governance system, SSRN Working Paper n° 292282. 
 
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1986), Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political 
Economy, 94: 461-488. 
 25
 
Simoneti, M., A. Bohm, M. Rems, M. Rojec, J. P. Damijan, B. Majecen (2003), Slovenia: 
Ownership and Performance of Mass Privatised Firms, Chapter 2 in Blaszczyk, B., I. Hoshi 
and R. Woodward (eds.), Secondary Privatisation in Transition Economies, Palgrave 
Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
 
Stulz, R. (1988), Managerial control of voting rights: financing policies and the market for 
corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 25-54. 
 26
 
 
Table 1: Average shareholdings of the largest owner in mass privatised firms  
 
 
(a) Czech Republic 
 
  
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
Mean 
 
38.8 
 
42.8 
 
48.6 
 
51.9 
 
Median 36.3 42.0 47.5 49.7 
 
Std. Dev. 19.3 20.4 21.5 21.8 
 
Number of firms 652 652 652 652 
 
     
 
(b) Poland 
 
  
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
Mean 
 
33.9 
 
36.7 
 
42.1 
 
47.7 
 
50.3 
 
Median 33 33 33 33 33 
 
Std. Dev. 5.5 10.1 15.8 20.6 22.6 
 
Number of firms 441 440 439 439 439 
 
Source: Own calculation  
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Table 2: Poland: The largest shareholder in mass privatized firms, 1998-2000 
 
 
For each type of the largest shareholder the first row shows the number of firms, the second the 
average equity holdings and the third its standard deviation 
 
  
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
 
 
Foreign investor  
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
 
Domestic investors  
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
Of which: 
employees 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
     
individual 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
      
corporation 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
      
National Investment Fund 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
     
 State 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
Total 
 
 
33 
61.27 
27.40 
 
 
406 
49.46 
21.95 
 
 
9 
43.29 
16.01 
 
15 
63.01 
17.61 
 
75 
58.09 
22.63 
 
298 
46.56 
21.28 
 
9 
57.00 
24.26 
 
439 
 
44 
64.87 
26.61 
 
 
395 
48.73 
21.53 
 
 
13 
65.81 
22.16 
 
29 
54.20 
23.80 
 
100 
56.07 
22.85 
 
243 
44.65 
19.29 
 
10 
36.29 
19.74 
 
439 
 
52 
75.11 
 22.14 
 
 
387 
47.02  
20.5 
 
 
13 
55.3 
 17.36 
 
39 
57.52  
21.89 
 
124 
61.25 
 20.30 
 
199 
37.25 
 12.38 
 
12 
18.7  
7.54 
 
439 
 
 
 
 
 28
Table 3: Czech Republic: the largest shareholder in mass privatised firms,  
1996-1999 
 
For each type of the largest shareholder the first row shows the number of firms, the second the 
average equity holdings and the third its standard deviation 
 
 
 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
 
Individual 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
89 
35.12 
15.18 
 
92 
36.40 
16.70 
 
104 
39.39 
18.56 
 
108 
44.77 
22.74 
 
Industrial or commercial company 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
295 
46.60 
19.15 
 
371 
47.95 
20.48 
 
372 
53.90 
21.05 
 
404 
55.62 
20.93 
 
Investment fund 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
148 
27.97 
15.41 
 
127 
32.73 
18.25 
 
116 
42.03 
20.92 
 
96 
46.27 
21.16 
 
Financial institution 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
58 
38.03 
18.51 
 
33 
42.44 
17.16 
 
41 
47.70 
20.16 
 
27 
51.27 
22.61 
 
State 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
62 
33.05 
18.26 
 
29 
40.64 
20.47 
 
19 
37.07 
20.32 
 
17 
42.99 
20.43 
 
Total 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
652 
38.75 
19.26 
 
652 
42.75 
20.38 
 
652 
48.59 
21.49 
 
652 
51.94 
21.82 
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Table 4: Definition of variables  
 
 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Return on assets 
 
Ratio of earnings before taxes and depreciation to total assets.  
 
Size Natural logarithm of sales (in constant prices)  
 
 
Leverage 
 
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets  
 
Investment 
 
 
Ratio of net investment in fixed assets to total assets  
Type of the largest 
owner 
Dummies for different types of the largest shareholder in 1999 in 
the Czech Republic and in 2000 in Poland. In Poland we have 
foreign versus domestic investors, among which we distinguish 
between corporations, individuals, employees, the state and 
National Investment Funds. In the Czech Republic, there are five 
types of the largest owners: corporations, individuals, investment 
funds, financial institutions, and the state. 
 
First wave of voucher 
privatisation in the 
Czech Republic 
 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for companies included in 
the first wave of voucher privatisation, and 0 otherwise 
 
Share of the largest 
owner in 1996 
 
Logistic transformation of the percentage share of the largest 
shareholder (C1) of a company:  ln [C1/(100-C1)] 
 
 
National Investment 
Fund dummies 
 
Dummies for each of the 15 lead NIFs  
 
Industry dummies 
 
Dummies for industries to which firms belong. There are 12 
industries in the Czech Republic and 20 in Poland 
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Table 5: Determinants of ownership concentration in Poland (probit 
regressions) 
 
In columns (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variable is equal to one if in 2000 the firm has an owner with 
at least 50% of shares and zero otherwise. In columns (4), (5) and (6) the dependent variable is equal 
to one if the share of the largest owner has increased between 1995 and 2000 and zero otherwise. All 
independent variables, except dummies, are averaged over 1995-1999. The type of the largest owner 
refers to 2000. Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at 
the 5 percent level; and *** significant at the 1 percent level. All regressions include a constant term; 
the reference group for the ‘type of the largest owner’ is the combined category of State and National 
Investment Fund. 
See Table 4 for detailed definitions of variables. 
 
 
  
Increase in the share of the largest 
owner 1995 - 2000 
 
Presence of a majority shareholder 
in 2000 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Return on assets  
 
 
 
-0.731* 
(0.428) 
 
-0.685 
(0.436) 
 
-0.369 
(0.427) 
 
-1.078** 
(0.481) 
 
-1.048** 
(0.495) 
 
-0.685 
(0.467) 
Size 
 
 
-0.056 
(0.081) 
-0.160 
(0.088) 
0.119 
(0.102) 
-0.162** 
(0.083) 
-0.295*** 
(0.092) 
-0.166 
(0.109) 
Leverage 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
-0.014 
(0.047) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
Investment 
 
 
0.054 
(0.188) 
0.084 
(0.196) 
0.021 
(0.229) 
0.088 
(0.190) 
0.123 
(0.198) 
0.063 
(0.234) 
Firms listed on the WSE 
 
-0.487* 
(0.263) 
-0.610** 
(0.280) 
-0.730** 
(0.306) 
-0.599** 
(0.281) 
-0.798** 
(0.314) 
-0.970*** 
(0.367) 
Type of the largest owner 
  
      
     Foreign investor  1.722*** 
(0.285) 
2.353*** 
(0.290) 
 1.834*** 
(0.279) 
2.681*** 
(0.300) 
     Domestic investor ,  
        of which: 
      
        Corporation 
 
 
  1.850*** 
(0.200) 
  1.994*** 
(0.210) 
        Individual 
 
 
  1.455*** 
(0.281) 
  1.772*** 
(0.294) 
        Employees 
 
 
  1.351*** 
(0.437) 
  1.590*** 
(0.445) 
 
NIF dummies 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Industry dummies  
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Number of observations 
 
434 
 
434 
 
434 
 
434 
 
434 
 
434 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
 
0.160 
 
0.237 
 
0.415 
 
0.183 
 
0.274 
 
0.475 
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Table 6: Determinants of ownership concentration in the Czech Republic 
(probit regressions) 
 
In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is equal to one if in 1999 the firm has an owner with at 
least 50% of shares and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is equal to one 
if the share of the largest owner has increased between 1996 and 1999. All independent variables, 
except dummies, are averaged over 1995-1999. The type of largest owner refers to 1999. Standard 
errors are in parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; and 
*** significant at the 1 percent level. All regressions include a constant term; the reference group for 
the ‘type of the largest owner’ is ‘State’. 
See Table 4 for detailed definitions of variables. 
 
 
 
 Increase in the share of  the 
 largest owner 1996 – 1999 
        
(1)                 (2)            
Presence of a majority owner 
in 1999 
 
      (3)                        (4) 
 
Return on assets  
 
 
 
1.875*** 
(0.652) 
 
1.819*** 
(0.663) 
 
0.870 
(0.584) 
 
0.754 
(0.597) 
Size 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.038) 
0.013 
(0.040) 
0.067 
(0.037) 
0.073* 
(0.039) 
Share of the largest owner in 1996 
 
 
-0.383*** 
(0.063) 
-0.394*** 
(0.065) 
0.649*** 
(0.068) 
0.647*** 
(0.070) 
Leverage 
 
 
-0.089 
(0.250) 
-0.065 
(0.253) 
0.000 
(0.240) 
-0.035 
(0.241) 
Investment 
 
 
0.493 
(0.383) 
0.502 
(0.387) 
-0.045 
(0.346) 
-0.055 
(0.344) 
Firms privatised in the first wave of 
voucher privatisation 
0.104 
(0.179) 
0.079 
(0.181) 
-0.234 
(0.176) 
-0.256 
(0.180) 
 
Type of the largest owner  
    
        Corporation 
 
 
 1.034*** 
(0367) 
 0.921** 
(0.381) 
        Individual 
 
 
 0.826** 
(0.395) 
 0.526 
(0.408) 
        Investment fund 
 
 
 1.033*** 
(0.390) 
 0.652 
(0.402) 
        Financial institution 
 
 
 1.207** 
(0.488) 
 0.981** 
(0.464) 
 
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes 
 
Number of observations 610 610 610 610 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.092 
 
0.107 
 
0.158 
 
0.174 
 
